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Starting April 16th 2005 the E-Government Act of 2002 requires that the court provide access to the substance of all written opinions issued by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the official court reporter, in a text searchable format.

Written Opinions filed after April 16, 2005, are now searchable and available at no cost to ECF and PACER users.

ECF USERS: Enter your ECF login and password and click on the "Reports" option on the blue menubar. Click on the "Written Opinions" report to search for opinions or to view case specific opinions filed after April 16, 2005. You will NOT be prompted to enter your PACER login and password.

PACER USERS: Enter your PACER login and password and click on the "Reports" option on the bluemenu bar. Click on the "Written Opinions" report to search for opinions or to view case specific opinions filed after April 16, 2005. You will NOT be charged for running this report or viewing, printing or saving opinions listed on this report. To avoid billing charges, ALWAYS use the "Written Opinions" report to view, print or save court opinions.

Case Name: General Electric Company v. Latin American Imports, S.A., d/b/a LATAM, et al.

Abstract: The court dismissed Latam's remaining promissory estoppel counter-claim because the promise GE allegedly made was not sufficiently definite to contradict the clear terms of the parties' contract and because Latam's alleged reliance on GE's alleged promise was not justified, as that promise was indefinite as to duration, transgressed the termination and integration (merger) clauses of the parties' written contract, and was inconsistent with another term of that contract.

Case Name: Siemens Building Technologies, Inc. v. BTS, Inc.

Abstract: This order denied the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration because the plaintiff failed to show that the court committed an error in its order granting in part and denying in part the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and the plaintiff failed to present newly discovered evidence. Additionally, because the defendant filed bankruptcy before the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration became ripe, the court appeared to be without jurisdiction pursuant to automatic stay provisions of 11 U.S.C. Section 362(a).

Case Name: General Electric Co. v. Latin America Imports SA, et al.

Abstract: In this order, the court denied the defendants' motion for a new trial because the defendants failed to object to the allegedly improper comments made by the plaintiffs' counsel during voir dire, cross-examination of the main defendant, and closing argument. Additionally, the defendants failed to show a reasonable probability that the comments influenced the jury in light of the curative instructions given by the court.

Case Name: Veronica Ayers v. C&D General Contractors, et al.

Abstract: Plaintiff brought suit under Section 905(b) of the Longshore and Harbor Workers Compensation Act, contending employer was liable to its employee as the vessel owner. Both parties filed cross- motions for summary judgment on the scope of coverage provided by three insurance contracts. In interpreting the contracts, the Court held that Plaintiff was covered under the Workers Compensation/Employers Liability policy and that the Commercial General Liability and Umbrella polices would apply if the Plaintiff was determined to be a 'temporary worker.'



Case Name: Stephanie Grego v. Meijer, Inc.

Abstract: Plaintiff filed suit against Defendant, her former employer, alleging various claims predicated on several instances of alleged sexual harassment that occurred during her employment. Defendant moved for summary judgment. The Court held that: 1) Plaintiff alleged acts sufficiently severe and pervasive that a reasonable jury could find that a hostile work environment existed; 2) the exclusivity provision of the Kentucky Workers' Compensation Act barred Plaintiff's negligent supervision claim; 3) while the Supreme Court of Kentucky has not considered the question of whether KRS 344.450 authorizes punitive damages, Court would assume that punitive damages are available in civil rights action; and 4) for purposes of summary judgment Plaintiff had alleged facts that could establish Defendant acted toward Plaintiff with oppression, fraud, or malice.



Case Name: United States of America v. W. Anthony Huff

Abstract: Defendant, Anthony Huff, moved the Court to dismiss the indictment pending against him based on alleged violations of the Speedy Trial Act and his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. The Court held that:1) it made appropriate findings at the time it granted the United States's motion for a continuance, and that once it entered those findings in the record it had complied with the procedural requirements necessary to support an ends of justice continuance under the Speedy Trial Act; (2) the Court's findings were sufficient to support an 'ends of justice' continuance under 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8); (3) section 3161(h)(8)(B) did not bar the Court from granting an 'ends of justice' continuance because under the circumstances the United States's failure to turn over discovery documents did not amount to a lack of preparedness; and (4) Defendant failed to show that the delay in trial caused him to suffer the type of 'substantial prejudice' required to establish a Sixth Amendment speedy trial violation. Accordingly, Defendant's motion was DENIED.



Case Name: Fair Housing Council, Inc., et al. v. Village of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., et al.

Abstract: Plaintiffs, the Fair Housing Council, Inc. and the Center for Accessible Living, Inc. brought suit against Defendants, the Village of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., WKB Associates, Inc., and Kenneth R. Brown pursuant to the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (?FHAA?), 42 U.S.C. § 3601 et seq. for failing to design and construct three different multifamily residential developments so as to be accessible to handicapped persons. The parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. The Court concluded that Plaintiffs had standing to maintain the action based on applicable Sixth Circuit precedent, and that the FHAA generally applied to each the developments at issue. The Court also concluded that Plaintiffs? claims were not barred by the applicable statute of limitations. As to liability, the Court determined that a trial was necessary to resolve several disputed issues of material fact regarding the accessibility of the units.



Case Name: Keith B. Baranski, et al. v. Fifteen Unknown Agents of ATF, et al.

Abstract: Plaintiffs, Keith B. Baranski and Pars International Corporation, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against Defendants, agents of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, alleging that Defendants obtained an unlawful search warrant and then violated Plaintiffs? Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by seizing 372 machine guns under authority of the warrant. The subject warrant was issued by a magistrate judge who sealed the affidavit supporting the warrant and identifying the machine guns for seizure after issuance of the warrant. Defendants moved for summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity. The Court held that Defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because Plaintiffs did not have a clearly established constitutional right to a unsealed affidavit. The Court also held that Plaintiffs could not rely on the violation of federal statute as a vehicle for alleging a constitutional claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Agents, et al., 403 U.S. 388 (1971).



Senior District Judge Charles R. Simpson III

Case Name: Hasken v. City of Louisville, et al.

Abstract: Parties filed cross motions for partial summary judgment on the issue of equitable tolling of the statutes of limitation. Held: The plaintiffs, firefighters for the City of Louisville, have failed to prove that they were reasonably unaware the City was underpaying them overtime in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act such that the statute of limitations should be tolled. The Fair Labor Standards Act claims of all plaintiffs falling outside of the statute of limitations are dismissed.

Case Name: Michael Hasken, et al. v. The City of Louisville

Abstract: The plaintiff's motion to proceed as an FLSA collective action is granted because all plaintiffs are similarly situated. The motion for class certification of the state law claims under Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(b)(3) is denied. Because a large number of the potential class members are already pursuing these claims in state court, and because we question our supplemental jurisdiction to hear these claims, we find that a class action is not a superior method for the adjudication of this matter.