Opinions

Starting April 16th 2005 the E-Government Act of 2002 requires that the court provide access to the substance of all written opinions issued by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the official court reporter, in a text searchable format.

Written Opinions filed after April 16, 2005, are now searchable and available at no cost to ECF and PACER users.

ECF USERS: Enter your ECF login and password and click on the "Reports" option on the blue menubar. Click on the "Written Opinions" report to search for opinions or to view case specific opinions filed after April 16, 2005. You will NOT be prompted to enter your PACER login and password.

PACER USERS: Enter your PACER login and password and click on the "Reports" option on the bluemenu bar. Click on the "Written Opinions" report to search for opinions or to view case specific opinions filed after April 16, 2005. You will NOT be charged for running this report or viewing, printing or saving opinions listed on this report. To avoid billing charges, ALWAYS use the "Written Opinions" report to view, print or save court opinions.

Case Name: Mary Ann Tobin v. Jennifer Troutman and United States of America

 

Abstract: In June, 1999, the Court denied in part and sustained in part Defendants' motions to dismiss Plaintiff's claims. One of the government's unsuccessful motions asserted that the Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's tax refund claim because she had failed to exhaust requisite administrative procedures. The Court subsequently granted the government leave to renew the motion to dismiss on this ground. Upon reconsideration, the government's motion to dismiss is denied. Plaintiff did prematurely commence her suit outside of the time period specified by 26 U.S.C. Sections 6532(a) and 7422(a). However, by filing a supplemental complaint alleging agency denial of her administrative claim, Plaintiff sufficiently cured this jurisdictional defect.
 

 

Case Name: Kentucky Restaurant Concepts, Inc. d/b/a PT's Showclub, et al. v. The City of Louisville, et al.
 
 
Abstract: Plaintiffs, two adult entertainment clubs and several entertainers working therein, filed this action seeking preliminary and permanent injunction of Louisville Code of Ordinances ("L.C.O.") §§ 111.001-111.008, the City of Louisville's adult entertainment regulatory scheme. The Court held that: 1) the City's substantive regulations of adult entertainment – the so-called "buffer zone" and related regulations – survived constitutional scrutiny; 2) the City's disclosure requirements of applicants for establishment and entertainer licenses were not an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, but certain personal information, the disclosure of which would violate privacy and endanger safety, must not be publicly released; 3) the City may request social security numbers but may not reject an application for failure to provide such; 4) the City's "criminal disability" provisions, which prohibited persons recently convicted of certain crimes from obtaining licenses, were constitutional; 5) the City's "strict liability" provisions did not create an irrebuttable presumption of guilt which would violate due process rights; 6) the City's periodic inspection provisions contained no limitation as to time of search and must be presumed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; 7) the City failed to justify its license application fees; 8) the City's licensing process imposed a prior restraint on First Amendment freedoms; and 9) the unconstitutional provisions of L.C.O. §§ 111.001-111.008 were nonseverable from the constitutional provisions. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was SUSTAINED, and the Court permanently enjoined enforcement of L.C.O. §§ 111.001-111.008 as to cabarets, adult cabarets, and the entertainers working therein.
 

 

Senior District Judge Charles R. Simpson III

Case Name: Lynch v. Lear Seating Corporation, et. al.

Abstract: Defendant Constitution States Service Company's motion for summary judgment granted because plaintiff failed to establish it acted in bad faith in denying his workers' compensation claim. Defendant Travelers Property casualty Corp.'s motion for summary judgment granted because it is a holding company for CSSC and thus a separate entity with no liability. Plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment denied because an agency relationship between Lear and its co-defendants has not been established.

Senior District Judge John G. Heyburn II

Case Name: Kentucky Restaurant Concepts, Inc. d/b/a PT's Showclub, et al. v. The City of Louisville, et al.

Abstract: Plaintiffs, two adult entertainment clubs and several entertainers working therein, filed this action seeking preliminary and permanent injunction of Louisville Code of Ordinances ("L.C.O.") §§ 111.001-111.008, the City of Louisville's adult entertainment regulatory scheme. The Court held that: 1) the City's substantive regulations of adult entertainment – the so-called "buffer zone" and related regulations – survived constitutional scrutiny; 2) the City's disclosure requirements of applicants for establishment and entertainer licenses were not an unconstitutional prior restraint on speech, but certain personal information, the disclosure of which would violate privacy and endanger safety, must not be publicly released; 3) the City may request social security numbers but may not reject an application for failure to provide such; 4) the City's "criminal disability" provisions, which prohibited persons recently convicted of certain crimes from obtaining licenses, were constitutional; 5) the City's "strict liability" provisions did not create an irrebuttable presumption of guilt which would violate due process rights; 6) the City's periodic inspection provisions contained no limitation as to time of search and must be presumed unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment; 7) the City failed to justify its license application fees; 8) the City's licensing process imposed a prior restraint on First Amendment freedoms; and 9) the unconstitutional provisions of L.C.O. §§ 111.001-111.008 were nonseverable from the constitutional provisions. Accordingly, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment was SUSTAINED, and the Court permanently enjoined enforcement of L.C.O. §§ 111.001-111.008 as to cabarets, adult cabarets, and the entertainers working therein.

Case Name: United States of America v. W. Anthony Huff, et al.

Abstract: Defendant moved the Court to disqualify the Office of the United States Attorney for the Western District of Kentucky from prosecuting him on various federal charges. U.S. Attorney Stephen Pence had previously served as Defendant's counsel in this action and had been personally and substantially involved in his defense. The Court held that:1) the Ethical Standards for Prosecutors Act, 28 U.S.C. 530B, requires that federal government attorneys abide by the ethics rules of the states in which they practice; 2) the Supreme Court of Kentucky's holding in Whitaker v. Commonwealth, 895 S.W.2d 953 (Ky. 1995), required that a Commonwealth Attorney's office must be disqualified from prosecuting a defendant whom a lawyer therein previously has represented personally and substantially; 3) neither Whitaker nor post-Whitaker precedent has clarified whether this rule applies to U.S. Attorney's offices; and 4) the Court predicts that the Kentucky Supreme Court would not apply Whitaker to U.S. Attorney's offices. Accordingly, Defendant's motion was DENIED.

 

 

Case Name: Wendy Hobbs Edwards v. Ford Motor Company, et al.

Abstract: Plaintiff filed suit against her former employer alleging multiple claims of employment discrimination. Plaintiff's motion for the Court to reconsider its prior grant of summary judgment to Defendant and reinstate Plaintiff's case denied on the grounds that: i) the new affidavit attached to Plaintiff's current motion is not admissible under Rule 59(e) and will not be considered; and ii) Plaintiff cannot establish that she had a record of or was regarded as being disabled by Defendant.

 

 

District Judge Jennifer B. Coffman

Case Name: General Electric, et al. v. Latin American Imports, S.A. d/b/a LATAM, et al.

Abstract: In this opinion, the court awarded GE summary judgment on certain of LATAM's remaining counterclaims and denied summary judgment on others. Specifically, the court granted GE summary judgment on Counts 1, 2, 4 and 5 of LATAM's fraud counterclaims, finding them barred by the economic loss doctrine. Summary judgment was denied on Count 3, a fraud counterclaim alleging that GE misrepresented to LATAM that it would be awarded the exclusive long-term distributorship of GE-DAKO (a GE-controlled Brazilian joint venture which manufactures appliances) in Peru if LATAM agreed to invest monies for infrastructure and purchase a certain amount of merchandise. The court also granted GE summary judgment on Counts 8 and 9, LATAM's contract and promissory estoppel claims regarding GE's alleged agreement/promise that it would not terminate LATAM or fail to renew its distributorship except for cause. Additionally, GE was granted summary judgment on Count 10, LATAM's contract claim premised on an alleged agreement that GE would not use MABE to distribute GE products in Peru, but summary judgment was denied on Count 11, LATAM's promissory estoppel counterclaim based on that alleged promise. Finally, the court granted summary judgment on Count 12, LATAM's unjust enrichment counterclaim, and Count 13, a counterclaim alleging violation of the Florida Franchise and Distributorship Act.

Case Name: General Electric, et al. v. Latin American Imports, S.A. d/b/a LATAM, et al.

Abstract: In this opinion, the court denied GE's motion for summary judgment on Count 14 of LATAM's counterclaims, tortious interference. This counterclaim alleged that GE and GE Information Systems ("GEIS") interfered with the participation of Perusphere (LATAM's affiliate, which is also owned and controlled by the owner of LATAM) in the EDITRADE consortium by meeting with other consortium members and announcing that GEIS might want to buy an interest in the consortium, but conditioning further negotiations on the elimination of Perusphere. Although Count 14 of the counterclaims pled tortious interference with a contractual relationship, Florida law requires the court to examine LATAM's allegations and determine whether they state a claim for tortious interference with a business relationship, a broader cause of action. Finding the allegations sufficient to survive summary judgment on this cause of action, the court denied GE's motion with regard to the tortious interference counterclaim.

Case Name: General Electric Co., et al. v. Latin American Imports, S.A. d/b/a LATAM, et al.

Abstract: In this opinion, the court granted GE summary judgment on LATAM's antitrust counterclaims, Counts 6 and 7 of the Second Amended Counterclaim. LATAM's theory of the case was that GE embarked on a scheme whereby it induced LATAM to serve as its distributor in Peru and develop a market for GE appliances, then refused to renew LATAM's distributorship contract and set about to destroy LATAM, with the effect that LATAM, an important trade "bridge" by virtue of its success in developing the Peruvian market for sale of U.S. appliances, could not ally itself with competing U.S. appliance manufacturers, allowing GE to stifle competition and monopolize the market. The court found that LATAM had not adequately shown antitrust injury, noting that the harm it identified in the market was not harm to LATAM, but to other American appliance manufacturers, so that LATAM had not shown that its injury resulted from decreased competition. Further, the court noted the speculative nature of this alleged anticompetitive effect, which weakened LATAM's ability to show that the jurisdictional requirements of the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvement Act of 1982 ("FTAIA") were met, in addition to antitrust injury. Due to the court's award of summary judgment to GE on LATAM's antitrust counterclaims, the parties' pending Daubert motions to exclude the testimony of proffered antitrust experts were denied as moot.

Case Name: General Electric Co., et al. v. Latin American Imports, et al.

Abstract: The court rejected GE's request to revisit its rulings declining to dismiss LATAM's antitrust counterclaims, finding that GE had made no new arguments warranting reversal of the earlier rulings. The court also denied GE's motion in the alternative to certify this issue for immediate appeal, finding that certification would not materially advance the ultimate termination of this litigation. Further, the court denied GE's motions for (1) extension of time in which to disclose expert witnesses and provide copies of their written reports, and (2) partial stay of discovery. The court granted GE's motion to file its reply memorandum (relating to its motion to reconsider) out of time, and noted that the memorandum had been duly filed and considered.

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