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Opinions

Starting April 16th 2005 the E-Government Act of 2002 requires that the court provide access to the substance of all written opinions issued by the court, regardless of whether such opinions are to be published in the official court reporter, in a text searchable format.

Written Opinions filed after April 16, 2005, are now searchable and available at no cost to ECF and PACER users.

ECF USERS: Enter your ECF login and password and click on the "Reports" option on the blue menubar. Click on the "Written Opinions" report to search for opinions or to view case specific opinions filed after April 16, 2005. You will NOT be prompted to enter your PACER login and password.

PACER USERS: Enter your PACER login and password and click on the "Reports" option on the bluemenu bar. Click on the "Written Opinions" report to search for opinions or to view case specific opinions filed after April 16, 2005. You will NOT be charged for running this report or viewing, printing or saving opinions listed on this report. To avoid billing charges, ALWAYS use the "Written Opinions" report to view, print or save court opinions.

Case Name: Nichelle Rodgers v. Apple South, Inc.

Abstract: Defendant was entitled to summary judgment when Plaintiff's only evidence of retaliation was the temporal proximity of her complaint and demotion. Defendant provided a legitimate business reason for Plaintiff's demotion, sexual harassment and a cash shortage. Plaintiff was unable to rebut this explanation or prove that it was a pretext for retaliation. The Court also dismissed Plaintiff's discrimination claim because Plaintiff did not prevent sufficient evidence to establish that she was replaced by a non-protected employee or that non-protected employees were treated better than her under similar circumstances. Because Plaintiff had recently been promoted and already faced sexual harassment complaints, her case was not analogous to other employees who had with one cash shortage.

Case Name: Sherrie Sprowls v. Oakwood Mobile Homes, Inc. and William Rotert

Abstract: A mandatory arbitration agreement is not enforceable if the employee never signed it and had no knowledge of it. The fact that the agreement was sent to the employee's house does not change this, nor does the fact that the agreement stipulated that the employee would be bound to arbitrate if she continued employment. Arbitration agreements, like other contracts, require acceptance.

Case Name: Sandra Hampton, Parent and Next Friend of Ollie Hampton, et al. v. Jefferson County Board of Educati

Abstract: Plaintiffs brought a lawsuit seeking entry to Central High Magnet Career Academy. After the Court ruled that the 1975 desegregation decree in Haycraft v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. allowed the Board's use of racial guidelines in student assignment, Plaintiffs moved to dissolve the decree. The Court found no current vestiges of de jure segregation. The Court found the School Board in continuing good faith compliance with the Decree. The Court also found that Jefferson County's racial demography could cause a latent racial imbalance in student assignment. Yet because changing the county's racial demography was not the decree's purpose, because achieving such change was impracticable, and because majority black schools will no longer carry the stigma of state enforced segregation, the county's racial demography could not sustain the Decree. The Court also held that, absent the decree, the use of hard racial quota dneied African-American students an equal opportunity to attend Central High School, the county's only law and medicine magnet school, therefore, imposed an unconstitutional burden. The rule against hard racial quotas may apply to other magnet schools. The Court orders no other change in the student assignment plan. Plaintiffs' motion to dissolve desegregation decree sustained; Defendants' and Intervenors' motions for directed verdict denied.

Case Name: Fair Housing Council, Inc., et al. v. Village of Olde St. Andrews, Inc., et al.

Abstract: Defendants cannot avoid the Fair Housing Act's (FHA) mandates even if a local HUD official erroneously told them that their buildings complied with the FHA. Defendants certified to the HUD official that they had complied with local and federal laws before he gave his opinion. Moreover, Congress intended to place the burden of determining compliance on builders and architects, not government officials. This intention is in accordance with a long line of cases holding that the acts of individual federal officers or agents do not create a claim for estoppel, at least absent affirmative misconduct. Defendants cannot differentiate their case from earlier cases on the ground that Plaintiffs are not the government. Congress designed the FHA to be enforced by interested parties other than the government, and individual officials still cannot create an estoppel action that would change the application of a law passed by Congress.

Senior District Judge Charles R. Simpson III

Case Name: Federal Election Commission v. Freedom's Heritage Forum, et al

Abstract: The Motion to Dismiss made by the Defendants is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Exhibit 5 does not contain express advocacy, and Count VII of the Second Amended Complaint is dismissed as to Exhibit 5. Exhibits 6 and 7 do contain express advocacy, and therefore the motion is denied as to those exhibits.

Case Name: Hardy v. Jefferson Community College, et al

Abstract: Plaintiff's Motions for Default Judgment and to Compel Discovery are DENIED. Defendants' Answer is not due at this time due to Defendants' interlocutory appeal. Discovery will also be stayed pending that appeal.

Case Name: Iroquois Manor, et al. v. Walgreen Co.

Abstract: The defendant moved to dismiss the complaint based on this Court's prior ruling in the matter. Held: The defendant's motion is granted. In the prior Order issued in this matter, this Court declined to imply a covenant of continuous operation. Therefore, the plaintiff cannot succeed on a claim for breach of this covenant when no such covenant exists. Furthermore, the plaintiff cannot succeed on a claim for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing when the defendant's actions were permissible under the lease. Thus, the plaintiffs' claims for breach of the implied covenant of continuous operation and for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing are dismissed. The plaintiffs' claim for breach of the obligation to share in the cost of maintaining, cleaning, repairing, and lighting the parking area remains.

Case Name: Azmat v. Secretary, Department of Health and Human Services

Abstract: Action arising from submission of an adverse action report to the National Practitioner Data Bank. HHS moved to dismiss the complaint. Held: 1) Count IV dismissed on the ground that diminution of reputation is not afforded constitutional protection by the Due Process Clause; 2) Count V dismissed on the ground that courts which have considered the issue have not found an implied right of action for physicians under the Health Care Quality Improvement Act; 3) Dismissal denied as to Counts I and II on the ground that HHS has failed to establish jurisdictional defects or that Azmat's claims are beyond the scope of Privacy Act review; 4) Dismissal denied as to Count III on the ground that the contention that HHS acted reasonably is merely argument of counsel and not a proper basis for dismissal under 12(b)(6).

Case Name: R.M.D. Corporation v. Gary C. Hammond

Abstract: R.M.D. moved to stay arbitration proceedings. Hammond moved to dimiss and to stay these proceedings and compel arbitration. Held: Hammond's employment contract with R.M.D. containing the arbitration provision is enforceable. Even if R.M.D.'s then President did not have actual or apparent authority to enter into the contract, R.M.D. ratified the contract by acquiescing and accepting the benefits of Hammond's services for the company for several years. The fact that the President assigned Hammond to a different position and decreased his salary accordingly does not render the remaining provisions of the agreement inapplicable. Having found that an enforceable employment contract exists between R.M.D. and Hammond which contains a valid arbitration provision, it follows that R.M.D. has no grounds upon which to stay the arbitration proceedings. The motion to stay arbitration is denied. The motion to dismiss is granted. The motion to stay the proceedings and to compel arbitration is denied as moot.

Case Name: Leary v. Daeschner

Abstract: Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's First Amendment Claims are dismissed with prejudice, as a prima facie case has not been made.

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